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Psychopathology is the scientific exploration of abnormal mental states that, for more
than a century, has provided a Gestalt for psychiatric disorders and guided clinical
as well as scientific progress in modern psychiatry. In the wake of the immense
technical advances, however, psychopathology has been increasingly marginalized
by neurobiological, genetic, and neuropsychological research. This ongoing erosion
of psychiatric phenomenology is further fostered by clinical casualness as well as
pressured health care and research systems. The skill to precisely and carefully assess
psychopathology in a qualified manner used to be a core attribute of mental health
professionals, but today’s curricula pay increasingly less attention to its training, thus
blurring the border between pathology and variants of the “normal” further. Despite all
prophecies that psychopathology was doomed, and with neurobiological parameters
having yet to show their differential-diagnostic superiority and value for differential
indication, psychiatric diagnosis continues to rely exclusively on psychopathology in
DSM-5 and ICD-11. Their categorical systematic, however, is equally challenged,
and, supported by advances in machine learning, a personalized symptom-based
approach to precision psychiatry is increasingly advocated. The current paper reviews
the objectives of psychopathology and the recent debate on the role of psychopathology
in future precision psychiatry—from guiding neurobiological research by relating
neurobiological changes to patients’ experiences to giving a framework to the psychiatric
encounter. It concludes that contemporary research and clinic in psychiatry do not need
less but rather more differentiated psychopathologic approaches in order to develop
approaches that integrate professional knowledge and patients’ experience.
Keywords: descriptive psychopathology, clinical psychopathology, theoretical psychopathology, neuroscience,
self-experiences, mind, brain, machine-learning
The term “psychopathology,” from the Greek ψυχη´ (psyche) for “soul” or “spirit,” piα´θoς
(pathos) for “suffering,” and λoγo´τυpiα (logos) for “reason,” “discourse” or “opinion,” roughly
translates into “teachings of the sufferings of the soul” and was coined in 1878 by the
German psychiatrist Hermann Emminghaus (1). Yet, as a scientific discipline, psychopathology
is commonly agreed to have started only 35 years later, in 1913 with the publication of Karl
Japers’ book “Allgemeine Psychopathologie” [(2), English: “General Psychopathology”] (3–10). To
Jaspers, the subject of psychopathology was broadly “the individual as a whole in his illness, as
far as it is a mental and psychogenic illness” and “the soul of the individual,” respectively [(8),
p. 845]. With it, psychopathology had become the core science in psychiatry that, over the past
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century, has provided a “Gestalt” for psychiatric disorders
and successfully guided clinical as well as scientific progress
in psychiatry and clinical psychology (5, 6, 11). Yet, in the
wake of tremendous technological advances, within recent
decades, psychopathology has been increasingly eclipsed by
neurobiological approaches in both research and teaching (6, 8,
11, 12). In the following, we will therefore revisit the objectives
of psychopathology and discuss their current state and their
potential future role.
OBJECTIVES OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
In line with Jaspers’ general definition, psychopathology is
currently broadly defined, e.g., as “the scientific exploration
of abnormal mental states” [(6), p. S147], “the subject matter
of psychiatry, that is, pathologies of the psyche” [(9), p. 559],
or “the discipline that assesses and makes sense of abnormal
human subjectivity” [(10), p. 169]. Yet, despite this seeming
agreement, the specific objectives of psychopathology and—
consequently—its role in current and future psychiatric work
and research still lack common understanding in psychiatry
(6, 8). In 2010, the Task Force on Nosology and Psychopathology
of the World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry
(WFSBP) thus reviewed approaches, theories, tasks, and tools
of psychopathology in order to identify the main objectives of
psychopathology in order to evaluate its role in the twenty-first
century (8). It identified three main objectives of interrelated and
partly interdependent tasks—descriptive, clinical and theoretical
psychopathology (8). Illustrated by examples from (early)
psychosis research, these are outlined and discussed in the
following.
DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
The main tasks of descriptive or general psychopathology are
two-fold (8). The first task is to describe and to denominate
persons’ subjective experiences and behaviors in a way that allows
objective communication about them that is free of personal,
cultural and school-specific interpretations (8–10). In doing so,
ideally, psychopathology would provide a shared language (10).
Yet, some of the critique on general psychopathology might in
fact stem from the failure of the psychopathological community
to provide, maintain, and impart an unambiguous nomenclature,
i.e., from the lack of “a common language in the “Tower of Babel”
that science has become” [(8), p. 848].
The early detection and intervention in psychoses is one such
recent field of research in psychiatry in that such a persistent
Babylonian speech confusion and its effects can be observed
(13, 14). For example, in a recent critique of the ultra-high risk
(UHR) approach (15), the majority of arguments were based
on the assumed equality of UHR-relevant attenuated psychotic
symptoms (APS) assessed by clinicians in patient samples
using specific semi-standardized instruments and “psychotic-like
experiences” assessed in the community by lay-persons using
fully standardized instruments or by self-rating instruments (13,
14). In the critique (15), positive results in both assessmentmodes
were equally regarded as “slightly-but-not quite psychotic,” “low-
grade psychotic symptoms,” or “psychotic experiences,” albeit
studies showing that such community measures commonly
overestimate the presence of clinician-assessed APS to a degree
that casts serious doubts on their comparability (14, 16–18).
This lack of psychopathological understanding and the resulting
falsely assumed equality of phenomena of similar names (13, 14)
then paved the way to unfounded—if not, from a clinical point of
view, absurd—conclusions (14) such as “psychotic experiences”
merely being “a marker for the severity of non-psychotic states”
[(15), p.201].
However, Babylonian speech confusion is not restricted to
wrongly assuming phenomenological equality by using similar
terms interchangeably (13) but also includes using different
terms for equal phenomena—often in the context of different
schools. An example of this in psychosis literature is the
current nomenclature of patients’ self-descriptions of deviations
in their mental processes. While these, within a biomedical
theoretical framework, are known as “basic symptoms” (19–23),
within the framework of the phenomenological tradition in
philosophy, they are called “self-disturbances,” “anomalous self-
or subjective experiences” and “self-disorders” or “anomalous
world experiences” (21, 22, 24–26). Thus, already in light of such
imponderability of nomenclature, it might not be all surprising
that, in psychiatry and related fields, researchers and clinicians
alike increasingly seek rescue in neuroscience and its more
definite terms and palpable constructs.
The second task of general psychopathology, including
“special” and “functional” psychopathology, is to distinguish
“abnormal” from “normal” experiences and behaviors and to
describe the nature and developments of these “symptoms” (8).
In special psychopathology, the focus has been on patients’
self-experiences and self-reports of their mental states rather
than on their observable expressions and behaviors that are
regarded as important but less specific than personal experiences
in terms of first-person perspective narratives (5, 6, 9). Functional
psychopathology adopted a different strategy by defining deviant
mental functions by clinicians’ or third-persons’ observations
either of persons’ expressions and behaviors or by their test
performances, e.g., in neuropsychological tasks (8). With regard
to test performances, functional psychopathology commonly
defines the “abnormal” by standard deviations from the mean
or similar measures, e.g., in case of the construct “intelligence”
or of the 6th dimension, “cognitive impairment” of the severity
assessment of symptoms of psychosis introduced in DSM-5 (27).
Traditionally, focus in psychiatry has been on special
psychopathology. Yet, in the development of criteria-based
operational diagnoses in DSM and ICD, emphasis was laid on
interrater reliability rather than validity. Therefore, functional
psychopathology was given a more prominent role along with
the use of fully structured and sometimes even fully standardized
instruments in special psychopathology (5, 6, 8, 12). In special
psychopathology, however, empathy has been the main clinical
tool to recreate and understand the patients’ self-experience
and to shape the psychiatric encounter. Thereby, the clinician
systematically explores patients’ self-experiences and translates
these and certain accompanying aspects of their expression
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and behavior into specific predefined symptoms (5, 6, 9).
Such an empathetic, understanding approach does not rule
out the biomedical approach of seeing abnormal phenomena
as symptoms whose underlying dysfunctions are to be cured
but rather compliments it by exploring patients’ meaning of
their symptoms (9, 10). Besides, it does not rule out the use
of semi-structured interviews to ensure addressing all relevant
symptoms, including interviews specifically addressing self-
experienced “abnormalities” (25, 26, 28, 29). Yet, this should be
done in a conversational, context-sensitive way that supports
giving a Gestalt to the patient’s complaints (5, 9, 10, 12).
The Gestalt arising from a careful, detailed and thorough
exploration is more than simply an aggregation of symptoms—
just as the picture arising from a jigsaw puzzle is more than
the sum of its pieces; it is a coherent picture of the patient’s
mind and the foundation of a valid clinical and diagnostic
appraisal.
The skill to precisely and carefully assess special
psychopathology in a qualified manner used to be a core
attribute of mental health professionals, but today’s curricula
pay increasingly less attention to its time-consuming training
(5, 9, 12, 30). As a consequence, the border between pathology
and variants of the “normal,” whose supposed lack of clear
definition is often held against special psychopathology, is
further blurred. This ongoing erosion of the core skill of
psychiatry is further fostered by clinical casualness as well as
(economically) pressured health care and research systems (9)
and endeavors such as the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
project, whose aim is to classify “mental disorders based
on dimensions of observable behavior and neurobiological
measures” using big data approaches [(31), p.1205].
CLINICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Based on the descriptive psychopathology, nosological, or clinical
psychopathology identifies symptoms that are significant to
supposed nosographical distinctions and groups them together
in nosographical systems, i.e., syndromes and diagnostic entities
(8–10)—nowadays, increasingly with help of some kind of
statistical modeling (8). In doing so, it has laid the grounds
for studies into the causes of mental disorders, i.e., etiological
psychopathology, and to the development of evidence-based
treatment guidelines (8). Yet, mental disorders neither exist
per se nor are they distinct diagnostic entities, but commonly
share features. In mental health research, however, shared
features are not only problem of clinical psychopathology but also
of genetics (32) and neurobiology (33, 34).
Furthermore, these diagnostic entities in terms of mental
disorders are not merely defined by a selected group of
symptoms. In addition, they generally make objective
requirements on symptoms’ course, such as their minimum
time of persistence (thus including some consideration of the
crucial dimension of time (6)), their presentation (such as
current frequency of occurrence or association–or lack of it–with
certain situations or life events) and their non-functionality.
Thus, a certain self-experience might only become a “symptom”
in a pathological sense of meaning under certain circumstances,
and symptoms and syndromes or disorders should not be
equaled in discussions, such as in the exemplary critique of the
UHR approach (14, 15). The presence of a clinician-assessed
APS does not constitute presence of a UHR criterion that, in
addition, makes requirements on its frequency and course as well
as consideration of the context in that it occurs (14, 35–37). For
this reason, roughly only one of ten persons of the community
who had reported APS in a clinician-conducted interview
actually met UHR criteria (35). Thus, some of the problems of
distinguishing “normal” mental states from “abnormal” mental
disorder might not pertain to the definition of phenomena but
rather to their frequency and persistence allowances in diagnostic
criteria, which are often not decided based on data but expert
consensus.
Furthermore, current diagnostic manuals–and recent
approaches toward a dimensional nosology such as the
Hierarchical Taxonomy Of Psychopathology (HiTOP) initiative
(38, 39)–only rely on a fraction of possible symptoms that
merely convey a fragmented picture of a patient’s mind and
whose selection was mainly driven by reliability rather than
validity aspects (5, 12). Today’s psychiatric training, however,
is focusing on only diagnosis-relevant symptoms (9, 10, 12, 30)
that are frequently observable epiphenomena arising from
patient’s coping (incl. the search for meaning and explanation)
with different, often distressing self-experiences (5, 30). These
symptoms, however, had been initially intended only as
gatekeepers in terms of the minimum symptoms needed to make
a diagnosis rather than perceived as a conclusive description of
symptoms associated with the respective diagnosis (12). Thus,
in the wake of the introduction of DSM and ICD, “classics
of psychopathology are now largely ignored” and “research
in psychopathology is a dying (or dead) enterprise” [(12), p.
111]; and clinicians are discouraged from getting to know the
individual patient and from understanding the Gestalt of his or
her state of mind (5, 9, 10, 12, 30). Yet, as one commonly only
finds what one is looking for, findings of a study examining
case notes for descriptions of basic symptoms (40) are not
surprising. Basic symptoms, which represent a prototype of
patients’ self-experiences but are completely unconsidered
in diagnostic criteria of DSM and ICD, were 16 times more
likely reported by patients with psychotic disorder in a special
interview (28) than they were recorded in their case notes
(40).
THEORETICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Exceeding, yet depending on and interacting with both
descriptive and clinical psychopathology, theoretical
psychopathology is the study of etiology or pathogenesis and,
thus, strongly links psychopathology to neuroscience ((8); see
also ‘psychopathology in neuroscience and precision psychiatry’
below). It lends some validity to mental syndromes but also
provides the foundations for etiological and pathogenetic
research (8). However, with sacrificing validity to reliability
in DSM, the research targets provided by its diagnoses
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might be the wrong ones (12), thus gradually weakening
the cause of psychopathology. Furthermore, while theoretical
psychopathology borrowed methods from other science that
were subordinated to the needs of psychopathological research
in the past, with immense advances in neuroscience and genetics,
these increasingly took a life on their own, thereby losing their
already weakened psychopathological foundation (8). Thus, with
increasing separation of neuroscience and genetics from the
very subject of psychiatry—i.e., the mind, the “dehumanizing
impact” of DSM on the practice of psychiatry [(12), p. 111] will
be multiplied.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN NEUROSCIENCE
AND PRECISION PSYCHIATRY
Psychiatry and psychopathological research, in particular
theoretical psychopathology, has always been positioned on
a continuum between (natural) facts and (human) constructs
(8, 10). This is a unique, yet often forgotten feature of psychiatry
within biomedical science; and it is the mind rather than
“brain events by themselves” that is of interest in psychiatry
(5, 8, 10). Yet, this intermediate position has always fueled
discussions on the role and value of psychopathology between
advocates of different positions on this continuum, e.g.,
between neuroscientists located on the pole of natural facts and
philosophers located on the pole of human constructs, who
often lack a common language (8). Thus, with the two positions
drifting further and further apart in the process of increasing
specialization in science, psychopathology will have to make
their re-integration, i.e., the reintegration of “mind” and “brain,”
its explicit objective (8, 10).
In order to reach these aims, the still widely accepted limited
range of symptoms currently considered in diagnostic criteria
and the structures of diagnosis need to be broadened again
to the full range of patients’ self-experiences in descriptive
psychopathology and reassessed in clinical psychopathology
(5, 10–12). The same applies to specific concepts of properties
of the “psyche” or symptoms that often have been established
decades ago without subsequent examination of their nowadays’
social, historical and philosophical appropriateness and that are
often used without sufficient knowledge of their origin and
historical development (11, 13). Thus, today, neuroscientists
and geneticists who try to find the neurobiological or genetic
correlates of mental disorders or properties are faced with likely
inadequate concepts of mental disorders. Additionally, they
often lack understanding of the conceptual basis of their target
(disorder or property) and the validity of its assessment methods;
and rarely have a team member, e.g., a psychopathologist, able to
expertly address these matters (11).
In the last few years, machine learning has made huge
progress as a statistical method to classify and predict human
experiences and behavior, incl. mental disorders, based on
interpreting different kinds of information (41–44). Compared
to more traditional prediction methods (such as regression
analyses), predictive accuracy with machine learning methods
(such as Support Vector Machines, Random Forests, and Deep
Learning) increases from 30 to 40% to frequently over 90% in
individualized prediction that is the basis of precision psychiatry
(45). The use of these methods, however, is not restricted to
neuroscience—in that it is currently mainly used—but can well
be applied in psychopathology. In fact, it was recently shown
that clinical variables can perform as well as neurobiological ones
(46). Furthermore, other next generation statistical approaches
such as joint modeling, time series analyses or network models
might help identifying valid syndromes of little overlap if
not based only on the “small world” of symptoms currently
included in the definition of mental disorders (47, 48). Promising
to this aim are patients’ self-experiences in terms of basic
symptoms and anomalous self- or world experiences, respectively
(5, 20–23, 28, 29). These, in particular basic symptoms, have
the unbeatable advantage to clearly distinguish “normal” from
“abnormal” experiences as, by definition, they differ from
what patients consider to be their normal mental self and
functions. These subtle disturbances in any kind of mental
process (e.g., stress tolerance, drive, affect, thinking, speech,
perception, motor action, and central-vegetative functions) are
self-experienced with immediate and full insight into their
abnormal nature, and reported by patients as “abnormalities”
(20–23, 28, 29).
For all these different aspects to be considered, the different
specialties involved in this endeavor (incl. psychiatry, psychology,
neuroscience, philosophy, genetics, epidemiology, computer
science, and mathematics) will have to closely work together
on equal footing in order to succeed in understanding the
underpinnings and mechanisms of mental disorders. Developing
a clear common language and bringing together their particular
skills and expertise, multidisciplinary projects are needed:
• to validly define on a basic, fine-grained level what is
“abnormal” and “normal” both in human experience and in
brain function (10),
• to develop valid, reliable, broadly applicable, and sufficiently
economic instruments for the assessment of such
“abnormalities” whose assessment time should be fully
covered by health insurances—this bringing in health politics
(11),
• to detect if and how these “abnormalities” and “normalities”
relate to each other over time (6, 10, 11),
• to newly define valid and reliable nosological constructs,
i.e., syndromes or mental disorders, based on these
“abnormalities” (5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 49),
◦ that are also in terms with and perceptive about the
full range of complaints with that patients will present
themselves (5, 6, 10, 12, 49),
◦ allow precise personalized diagnosis and prognosis (6),
◦ for that efficient benign treatments exist or can be
developed, likely as modular therapies (49),
• to include the dimension of time, i.e., the likely course of
symptoms, in order to not only classify and treat the current
mental state (“Zustandsbild”) but the underlying illness
(“Krankheit”) and its psychosocial functional consequences
(6).
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CONCLUSION
Psychopathology is currently a neglected, if not dying science—
not least, because current concepts of mental disorders failed
to produce adequate neurobiological and genetic targets. Yet, as
we demonstrated, problems within the field of psychopathology
and the resulting neglect of psychopathology have brought
about this failure. Thus, contemporary research and clinic in
psychiatry do not need less but rather more differentiated
psychopathologic approaches in order to develop approaches that
integrate professional knowledge and patients’ self-experience
and offer more appropriate valid targets for neurobiological and
genetic research than the broad, rather ill-defined constructs that
definitions of mental disorders currently represent, i.e., as Nancy
Andreasen has pointed out repeatedly over more than 20 years
[(11), p. 112]:
“We need to make a serious investment in training a
new generation of real experts in the science and art of
psychopathology. Otherwise, we high-tech scientists may wake
up in 10 years [that is, now; comment by authors] and discover
that we face a silent spring. Applying technology without the
companionship of wise clinicians with specific expertise in
psychopathology will be a lonely, sterile, and perhaps fruitless
enterprise.”
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